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BEHIND CLOSE DOORS: GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN
PRIVATE EQUITY DRIVEN INDUSTRIES – THE CLOSE
CORPORATION PARADOX AND ITS IMPACT ON
PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE US AND SWEDEN.
Kristian Hermanrud *
Publicly traded companies make up only a small fraction of the vast number of
corporations operating in the US today. Only about 10,000 companies are traded
publicly while there are roughly 20 million corporations doing business in the US. 1
Likewise, over 245 private corporations’ annual revenues exceed $ 1 billion. Among
these, more than twelve employ more than 50,000 employees. 2 Despite the influence on
vast amounts of people and capital legislature has, to a large degree, focused on publicly
traded companies. The reasons for this stem, in large, back to the years of the market
crash in the early thirties and has since given rise to a multitude of regulatory and
legislative actions. The recent scandals giving rise to the Sarbanes Oxley Act and, most
likely, new regulation pertaining to the recent credit crisis impacts the governance of
companies across the globe. Different regulatory schemes have evolved to remedy
situations arising in an ever more complex corporate market. In the US, a system of
enabling legislation has arisen. The basic principle is that freedom of contract will create
a more efficient market. Choosing in which state and how to incorporate will allow for
decisions regarding form, taxes, liabilities and contractual rights. In Europe, regulation
has instead focused in part on safeguarding rights be enacting regulations to limit
certain actions and the restrictions imposed are based on which nation you start your
enterprise in. The paradox of whether to enable efficient markets by creating freedom or
safeguarding against venture capital vultures becomes strikingly apparent in the close
corporation. This article aims to compare elements of the regulatory policies in the
largest per capita private equity market in the world, the United States, and the third
* J.D. Uppsala University faculty of Law, LLM-candidate Suffolk University Law School; For comments, revisions
and conversations on Swedish law I am indebted to Jonas Ljungberg and Niklas Elofsson, Uppsala Faculty of Law. For
grammatical expertise and careful scrutiny I am very thankful to my colleague Luigi Tollis at Suffolk University Law
School. For discussions, comments and ideas I am thankful to Professor Polito and Professor Gibson at Suffolk
University Law School. Lastly I want to thank my wonderful wife Christina for your continued support on these
endeavors.
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largest, Sweden. After I describe how approaches to corporate governance in the US
might impact the private equity market (by imposing fiduciary duties and how those
duties can be circumnavigated ex ante) I will describe the Swedish corporate regulatory
environment. Special focus will be given to differences in capital requirements and how
fiduciary duties play a role in maintaining shareholder rights. By describing the different
approaches to regulating corporate governance a picture starts to emerge which shows
that despite differences in governance techniques and risk allocation devices employed,
an effective market seems to have emerged in both countries.
US REGULATION IN LARGE
Stemming from a climate where state legislatures try to appeal to corporate interests,
some say the development of corporate law in the US is a “race to the bottom” 3 . Others
proclaim the law is a process of evolution and as such is a “race to the top” where the
best corporate solutions will prevail.4 Both premises are warranted and it is quite possible
that they can coexist. Providing an attractive environment for incorporation has several
advantages to both the corporation and the host state. For the corporation, modern
corporate codes provide market efficiency coupled with reduced costs should a litigious
situation arise. For the host state, the potential revenue streams provide a much needed
source of income. On the other hand, in their race to maintain an attractive breeding
ground for corporations, states will undoubtedly make use of the most attractive
corporate statutes. Such statutes are often those providing corporate law which mimics
the principals found in contract law. The basic premise being one where the parties are
allowed to contract as they please providing for greater freedom and flexibility. The
downside, as has been expressed by an increasing number of oppositional researchers, is
that this could diminish the actual remedies available to exploited parties. Given the
particular nature of the corporate environment a regulatory scheme which too heavily
relies on contractual principals could have a detrimental impact on the willingness to
invest if stakeholders perceive that systemic risks in the market outweigh the expected
return on capital.
3

Subraminian G., The influence of antitakeover statutes on incorporation choice: Evidence on the “race”
debate and antitakeover overreaching, 150 UPALR 1795, 2002.
4
Id.

The “race to the bottom” hypothesis is premised on the notion that states focus their
efforts to attract corporations by providing attractive venues for incorporation by allowing greater freedom. By relaxing corporate law states have been described as providing a
legislative agenda which;
“Was not one of diligence but one of laxity” 5
States wishing to provide an investor friendly environment could, for example,
provide statues allowing for comprehensive protection from shareholder actions in the
corporate bylaws thereby diminishing minority protection against incompetent boards.
Similarly, allowing corporations to be formed where the articles of incorporation allow
for de facto freeze-outs of minorities would perhaps be attractive to some, but would not
serve to heighten the markets confidence in such a state’s corporate laws and would
perhaps provide a breeding ground for new corporate scandals. 6 The potential impact on
the private equity market, which is particularly sensitive to correct risk assessment,
becomes apparent.
Another area of debate is that of takeover statutes. States may wish to provide for
extensive prohibitions on takeover defenses to provide a deterrent for dysfunctional
boards thereby allowing the market for corporate control to function effectively. This
trend is offset by some states, such as California, which provide for extensive shareholder
and minority protection in their corporate laws. Whether the federal government should
be allowed to intervene by passing federal regulations protecting societal and minority
interest is a much contested issue. Currently there exists a difference of opinion where
scholars, like Mark Roe, interpret regulation such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as
proof of the federal systems power and that states, especially Delaware, are simply a
venue which mimic federal regulations. 7 In contrast, scholars like Roberta Romano
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Ligget v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517.
For an excellent discussion about the fallacies in said theory see Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law,
Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469 2005.
7
Roe Mark J., The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
588 (2003).at 26.
6

proclaim that SOX is simply an exception to the general rule that states regulate fiduciary
duties and the distribution of powers between boards and shareholders. 8

STATUTORY IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In any public company the way in which the board of directors and managers utilize
their knowledge and competence will be directly reflected in share price, at least, that’s
the theory. Problems pertaining to the age old paradox of control versus ownership
therefore seldom arise in a well functioning corporation but are all the more plentiful
when dispersed shareholders are subject to economic loss due to the actions of the
management. Questions as to the effectiveness of the systems in place to safeguard
minorities against abuse and the effectiveness of the disciplinary functions of the market
have also recently become topics of debate. 9 Though the market undeniably plays an
important role in functioning as the best indicator of a company’s financial status and
position, it says little about the internal workings of the company. In theory ineffective
management will be sanctioned as the company will perform worse, thereby driving
down share prices – the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. 10 This however is premised
on transparency of corporate governance. We need only look at the recent crisis in the
capital markets to realize that perhaps there are issues of effectiveness which have not
been remedied. A problem arising with US regulation of corporate affairs seems to be
that these codes reflect little more than the explicit demands of contracting investors and
managers. 11 In other words, state regulations governing corporations could be little more
than an image of the prevailing idea of what a contract binding the parties should be. A
problem with such a system is that it might contribute to ineffective shareholder
protection and increase the willingness of managers to underestimate risks to increase
short term yields. In essence, the “contract” reflected in the state corporate legislation
might not reflect the needs of the oppressed or the market at large. First, there is no
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Romano Roberta, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance? Yale
Univ. Int'l Ctr. For Fin., Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005. at 39f.
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Dibadj Reza, Delayering Corporate Law, Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469, 2005. at 483.
10
Pinto A., Branson D., Understanding Corporate Law, Second edition, Lexis Nexis 2004 at 92.
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Roe, Mark J., Corporate Law's Limits . Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31. Delaware’s Politics, supra note
5 at 2496.

contract between shareholders and managers. Second, the shareholders are seldom aware
of internal dealings within a company and many think it safe to presume that disgruntled
shareholders would rather pursue managers with federal antifraud and state corporate law
than on theories of contract. 12 Despite this, many states have developed corporate law
which is little more than a wish list for managers, all in an effort to attract corporate
capital. Some have gone so far as to describe Delaware as “the brothel of corporate
law”. 13 The general principle, protecting shareholders and others from the malicious acts
of a menacing crew of managers or directors is, apart from state corporate statutes,
instead manifested in the concept of fiduciary duties.

GOVERNANCE BY IMPOSING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Fiduciaries are generally created when one is given power that carries with it a duty
to use that power to benefit another. 14 This relationship can be ascribed to a number of
different situations and can include partnerships, trustees, or other agents and principles.
There is no clear cut definition of fiduciaries and this ambiguity provides a potentially
wide area of application. Fiduciary duties are generally considered to consist of two
duties; the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. They are owed to the company by the directors in public corporations. As will be discussed later, the situation differs in closely
held corporations where fiduciary duties can be imposed even between the shareholders
and not only towards the company but towards each other. 15
The Model Act provides a baseline standard for a director’s fiduciary duties; he or she
must discharge their duties of loyalty “in good faith” and “in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”. 16 The duty of care is
described as requiring directors to perform their duties with the diligence of a reasonable
person in similar circumstances. The somewhat ambiguous language ascribes to the terms
used certain values. Acting in good faith means acting honestly and fairly and has primar12

Dibadj Reza, Delayering Corporate Law, Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469, 2005. at 469.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate
Governance? 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1189, 2003
14
Pinto A., Branson D., Understanding Corporate Law, Second edition, Lexis Nexis 2004.at 199.
15
see SEC v Chanery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86.
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ABA, (American Bar Association), Managing Closely Held Corporations, A Legal Guidebook,
Committee on Corporate Laws, 2003. At 32.
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ily an evidentiary function. Lacking good faith is often a clear signal that the given action
is a form of self dealing or other motive unlinked to the furtherance of the business. 17 An
objective standard can be described as “reasonably believes” (what a rational analysis by
others would deduce as being true). This is furthered by “person in a like position” and
implicates a test of common sense. “Care” is of vital importance in this context as it
clearly stipulates the need to make an informed decision. Ignorance is never an excuse for
making a poor business decision. However, having made sufficient enquiries, evaluating
the results and then making a poor decision is not considered a breach of care given it
could have been made by others under similar circumstances. Testing breach of care is
done by relating it to an inner safe harbor called the business judgment rule (BJR). This
standard of judicial review states a presumption in favor of the director and enforces a
presumption that the decision in question was informed and made in good faith. 18 Bad
business decisions are usually allowed if they are informed. Under this doctrine, the court
will focus on the decision making process, not the decision and the BJR therefore acts
upon a presumption about the decision. “In making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company” 19 The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to act
for the best interests of the corporation and in good faith. This is generally an issue when
a director or manager stands to make a decision from which he or she can personally
benefit. This duty is tested using the entire fairness doctrine. To test the fairness of a
transaction is no menial task and state Courts have developed intricate systems to derive
at answers to these problems.
Recent debates have begun probing the effectiveness of said principles. In a
recent study of Delaware corporate law and the application of common law doctrine of
fiduciary duties the author, Reza, describes the fiduciary duties as “little more than
eloquent rhetorical flourish”. 20 The duty of care seems to require gross negligence to be

17

ABA, (American Bar Association), Managing Closely Held Corporations, A Legal Guidebook,
Committee on Corporate Laws, 2003, At 34f.
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Id, At 41.
19
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
20
Dibadj Reza, Delayering Corporate Law, Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469, 2005., note 80 at 8.,
see also Kahn M., Rock E., Symbiotic Federalism and the structure of corporate law, Vanderbilt Law
Review, Oktober 2005, supra note 66, at 13.

breached and the duty of loyalty imposes only upon the directors to not engage in
apparent self dealing. Reza makes a statement in his article to the affect that;
Seeing as how the safe harbor of BJR calls for not only negligence, but “gross
negligence” and violators are found only when there is “reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the interests of the whole body of stockholders”

21

or “actions

which are without the bounds of reason.” 22
In an a critical article another author expresses the implications of the BJR in
Delaware as;
“Is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all. Rather, it is an expression
of a policy of non-review of a board of directors' decision when a judge has already
performed the crucial task of determining that certain conditions exist.” 23

FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
President Obama, in a recent speech, claimed small business alone provide for half of
the private sector employment in the US and create seventy percent of all new jobs. 24 The
closely held corporation, which dominates this sector, can be described as an
incorporated partnership. 25 Though many statues which stated a limit on the number of
shareholders have now been amended there is a general acceptance to the idea that a
close corporation has few shareholders. 26 Lacking a market where the shares can be
freely traded this is perhaps the most prevalent characteristic of a close corporation. Most
companies start as small corporations and, as the success of the venture becomes a
reality, investors seek to capitalize on the venture by going public or cashing out. As will
21

Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929).
Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974).
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Allen William T ., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware
Corporation Law, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859, 870 (2001).at 870.
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Address by President Obama on the 16th of March, 2009
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/29722440#29722440.
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Pinto A., Branson D., Understanding Corporate Law, Second edition, Lexis Nexis 2004. at 287.
26
In a recently published article the Massachusetts State Government surmised the position of the closely
held corporation as follows: A “closely held” corporation is a corporation “typified by: (1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation. The important
characteristic for the purposes of this article is that the management and ownership of a close corporation
is in the hands of a few, often only two, individuals. www.ma.gov.
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be described later these perceptual stages in development are especially important given
the fact that close corporation shareholders owe each other a heightened duty of care and
the relationship has the characteristics of an equal partnership. As such the duties owed
necessarily impact the investors risk assessment. The effect is also that any sale of shares
or mergers with other companies comes under the control of the few owners which might
tempt controlling parties to cut corners in order to effectuate a profit. Many close
corporations maintain agreements limiting minority shareholder influence which has the
effect of sometimes causing conflicts within the company as minorities are subject to a
“freeze-out”. Lacking a public arena to liquidate investments, stockholders are often
forced into bargaining with controlling shareholders. The scenario gives rise to a number
of issues such as that of loyalty, risk management, and business ethics. Absent clear
mechanisms of minority protection the closely held corporation would be an arena where
the strong survive at the expense of the weak. Since controlling shareholders often hold
positions as board or company directors, conflicts of interest easily arise.
Exploitation can take many forms such as salaries, bonuses, or other forms of wealth
transfer effectively distributing dividends but doing so in a matter so as not to give all
shareholders equal parts thereof. Sweden, in contrast to the US, imposes penalties to
remedy undercapitalization problems by stipulating stringent demands on corporate
capital. The rules in Sweden are primarily in place to protect creditors but, as will be
discussed, could even impact the investor incentive by limiting options to secure dividend
payments (on preferred shares for example). In the US a different approach has been
favored. In Delaware, along with approximately 15 other jurisdictions, the close
corporation special statutory provisions only apply to corporations which are
incorporated as close corporations. 27 The implications being that lacking such
incorporation an “unregistered” close corporation falls under the general provision of the
Delaware Corporate Code. The general statutes, in turn, are perhaps less useful to a
minority suffering from exploitation. 28 The problem was addressed in Nixon v
Blackwell, 29 where it was held that there are no special judge-made rules for closely held
27

Pinto A., Branson D., Understanding Corporate Law, Second edition, Lexis Nexis 2004. at 314.
New York Law Review, A plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 700 (1958).
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Nixon v Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (1993).
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corporations in Delaware. Protection is instead achieved through definitive shareholder
agreements.
“The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minority
shareholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with consideration”.
Anyone wishing to invest in a close corporation in Delaware should therefore do so
under the advisement of an attorney as the courts might be hesitant to provide remedies
ex post. 30 More often than not however, small business entities lack funding or
knowledge to form investment contracts. It is often the case that a shareholder enters into
a commitment based on personal knowledge or relationship to the corporation or its
founders. Many times family members are shareholders and naturally trust each other.
When the company experiences illiquidity or a party exploits their position the issue of
fiduciary duties arises. In these cases, lacking sufficient statutory protection and not
having previously formed adequate agreements to manage these disputes, the parties
might find themselves at the mercy of the courts and it becomes important to understand
how these duties are employed in a close corporation setting.
As a shareholder in a US closely held corporation, one becomes subject to an intricate
web of duties and opportunities and shareholders can have fiduciary duties to each
other. 31 Taking part in the management or even control of the business brings about many
opportunities which might favor not only the company as a whole, but the shareholder
individually. This could be construed as a breach of duty under the corporate opportunity
doctrine. The doctrine of heightened fiduciary duties in closely held corporations stem
from a Massachusetts case, Donahue v Rodd. 32 In Donahue, the Court stated that in a
close corporation, the fiduciary duty owed is not only the same as that of a partnership
but is subject to the same standard. 33
30

Pinto A., Branson D., Understanding Corporate Law, Second edition, Lexis Nexis 2004.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
32
Id.
33
“We have defined the standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the “utmost
good faith and loyalty.” Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith
standard. They may not out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their
duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation. …The controlling group
may not, consistent with its strict duty to the minority utilize its control of the corporation to
obtain special advantages and disproportionate benefit from its share ownership.”. Ibid
31

Special caution needs to be taken when the shareholder is a director or manager, as
then the insight into corporate affairs is even greater. Though no precedent clearly spells
out such a rule, it seems reasonable that greater insight should call for greater care not to
take advantage of corporate opportunities. Similarly, other dealings which might
disadvantage shareholders lacking insight into corporate affairs could be scrutinized
under this doctrine. Fact specific circumstances should therefore lay the foundation for
determining the scope of duties.
Acting as a director or manager also calls for greater levels of care as it gives rise not
only to duty of loyalty to the other shareholders, but also duties of care. Taking care to
execute only informed decisions, when they negatively impact other shareholders,
becomes vital in maintaining a reasonable level of diligence as set forth by the business
judgment rule. Recent debates have however raised questions as to the boundaries of the
business judgment rule. It is claimed that the scope of the business judgment rule has
become significantly expanded providing greater protection as the task of proving a
decision was not informed becomes increasingly difficult. The most efficient constructions to prevent claims for breaches of care are therefore ex ante. By providing clear
guidelines through shareholder agreements and maintaining a high level of care when
partaking in business decisions, the shareholder acting either as a director or
independently should be fairly well informed on the limitations of his or her duties and
liabilities. As was mentioned however, lacking funds for procuring adequate council, the
founders might be disadvantaged if savvy investors employ schemes to limit their duties.
The impact of said principles on the private equity market are unclear but what can safely
be stated is that with such large amounts of capital in the market and the apparent lack of
remedies being afforded to exploited parties perhaps the regulatory scheme will require a
new approach in the near future. 34

34

Beyond the remedies for breach of duty lie more drastic measures. In the case of oppression the remedy
may be as severe as involuntary dissolution of the company. In my opinion this is a drastic measure which
should not be used unless it has been proven to a point of certainty that it is the only way to allow for
remedy of the oppression. On the other hand, when the corporation is subject to a merger or sale of assets,
the appraisal remedy has become a common solution in many states. Depending on the type of merger
(cash or statutory) it is in my opinion appropriate to take this middle ground between imposing duties and
dissolution; the appraisal remedy can provide objective relief. This is, however, a complex issue and the
valuation of nonpublic stock is topic of much debate. In his thesis on appraisal rights Gustaf Sjöberg
expresses the view that appraisal rights should be seen in the context of the corporate setting and emphasis

EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Investors and creditors alike must manage their risk in order to accurately determine
premiums. For many investors the closely held corporation is the first stage in corporate
development. Many times a closely held corporation will be taken public in the
foreseeable future and thereby provide dividends or return on investment after a sale of
the shares. Given these premises, investors regularly employ tactics to minimize the risk
of said investments. In the close corporation setting, regulating the transference of shares,
dividend payments, seats on the board of directors, or power of veto, are commonly
employed tactics. Given these premises it becomes easy to see how such an investor
quickly becomes subject to the duties imposed under Donahue. The principles providing
protection to shareholders and the company are not always in line with the ideas of the
investor. The investor wishes to maximize return on investment, and this may call for
large dividend payments on preferred shares, liquidation of assets, mergers, or other
corporate transactions which might not benefit the shareholders at large. If, for example,
the corporation fails to meet the turnover required to provide adequate dividends, the
investor might have to choose between lowering dividend requirements or taking action
on the board by vetoing new investments or proposing a sale of assets. Either action
might constitute a business decision which disadvantages other shareholders if the
investor has preferred stock or similar standing giving the investors first right to profits.
To combat this situation the investor might choose an ex ante solution; a “fiduciary out”
clause in the investor contract. This makes possible the taking of actions which would
otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary duties, but limiting liability thereby preserving
investor incentives. Whether such provisions hold up in court is a difficult question to
answer. Given the situation in Delaware, where contracts entered into by willing parties
who have filed as a close corporation are enforced, the contract will, by my
determination, be enforced in such a state. In other jurisdictions, where perhaps the duties

is put on establishing the type of corporation, i.e. close or public, before determining the proper remedy.
The approach seems to fair well with the general presumption of determining duties depending on the
corporate environment in each specific case as opposed to establishing new tests for when shareholders
have been oppressed as it is clear that in a close corporation these tests are subject to such a severe degree
of variability that the foreseeability of applicable law might be jeopardized. See Sjöberg G. Tvångsinlösen,
Jure Förlag AB, 2007, At 445f.

of loyalty are more strictly enforced, the situation might be seen as one of self dealing. In
cases where the investor has both a seat on the board and maintains a standing as a
controlling shareholder it seems reasonable to view clear examples of oppression as
breaches of fiduciary duties. By imposing strong fiduciary duties courts could create and
atmosphere of accountability. History has proven, again and again, that there exist no
moral deterrent strong enough to act as an inhibitor in the corporate setting. Contrary to
this, the contractual freedom provided for in many state statutes have widened the
applicable field of “out” clauses available to investors unwilling to commit to the duties
otherwise imposed. The viability of such contracts became apparent in the recent Walt
Disney 35 case. In Disney, because the party was very careful in the way that they
structured the transaction, the Chancery court did not find the duties of care, loyalty, or
good faith were violated. It seems, in other words, that as far as the law in Delaware is
concerned, a wary investor, paying careful attention to the language in a contract, can
create a very favorable environment for doing business, perhaps at the expense of the
less-well-funded minority shareholders.
The business judgment rule has also evolved into a standard which calls upon the
exploited parties to prove something akin to gross negligence. Furthering this dilution of
protection is the fact that the Court of Chancery in Delaware has allowed for extensive
contractual provisions to circumnavigate the impact of the business judgment rule. 36 The
situation has been described as “anemic at best”. 37 Similarly, the duty of loyalty provides
little by means of imposing duties as investors are savvy in creating safeguards. This can
be done by establishing special committees or boards of independent shareholders. This
is problematic as it is doubtful that an independent board is truly independent when the
35

In re Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004); see also Roe, Mark J., Corporate Law's Limits . Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 31., note 14, at 243 “One does not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate
law has produced only one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to pay for
their mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkum, a decision excoriated by managers and their lawyers, and one
promptly overturned.”.
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Dibadj Reza, Delayering Corporate Law, Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469, 2005 at 9. A director is
only liable if he or she is grossly negligent, and the rule presumes that the director acted with due care . . .
. If the company has an exculpatory provision in its articles of incorporation, as nearly all publicly-held
corporations do, the plaintiff-shareholder must prove that the director failed to act in good faith or
intentionally harmed the corporation. As if these legal standards were not enough to reduce a director's
incentives to act with care, directors invariably have indemnification rights and insurance, and courts have
limited the ability of shareholders to obtain discovery in derivative actions alleging director misconduct.”.
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heavy weight of corporate control, posed by investors or the employers of the special
committee, are hovering above like a tiger ready to pounce. Different from an
independent court, the special committee is subject to the control and influence of the
corporation. It is therefore doubtful if such a solution is preferable to a court mediated
settlement. One need only look at recent discoveries as to the influence on credit rating
agencies and accounting firms to see why “independent” is perhaps more of a utopia than
a reality.
Summarily, the tactics of contracting around fiduciary duties have become more
commonplace. In jurisdictions such as Delaware these types of contracts have been
upheld despite being fairly obvious cases of self dealing. 38 It becomes of gravest
importance for an investor to carefully scrutinize where a closely held corporation is
incorporated. In states providing strong minority protection, actions viewed as self
dealing will probably be deemed as such in court voiding the clause or contract.
Contrarily if a closely held corporation is incorporated in Delaware the contractual
provisions of an investor contract will, to a much larger extent, be enforced. The discrepancy is problematic as it provides an area of uncertainty and therefore might impact
the market for venture capital negatively.

EUROPE AND SWEDEN
Today a corporation is but one of many types of business entities and its wide area of
applicability has become its trademark. Courts today are also finding ever wider ranges in
the application of corporate law. Many countries are also working towards finding new
forms corporations to allow for greater flexibility and availability to those wishing to
incorporate a business idea. Small and medium-seized enterprises (SMEs) have, over the
past decades, become increasingly important as they attract large amounts of venture
capital and often provide the stepping stone for corporations wishing to go public at a
later stage. The large impact of venture capital backed firms have been the topic of much
debate as they have been found to have significant impact on the product and labor
markets. Private equity and the private equity backed securities now impact countries
38

Dibadj Reza, Delayering Corporate Law, Hofstra Law Review, 34 HOFLR 469, 2005 specifically on
Disney.

around the world and in the US alone private equity and hedge funds were believed
contain over a trillion dollars in assets as recently as 2006. 39 In short the impact of the
flow of capital is enormous and governance of said markets should be a priority.
The wide array of business associations available in the US cannot be directly
translated to the Swedish market. Generally a corporation will be formed as a limited
liability company, or Aktiebolag; AB. 40 The possibility to elect to incorporate and be
taxed as a partnership (pass through taxation) is therefore generally not available. Two
forms of companies, the kommanditbolag and the handelsbolag, mimic rules for
partnerships with similar rules for loyalty and taxation. These corporate forms however,
lock the investor into other regulations which govern loyalty and profit sharing. The rules
are similar to those of partnership laws in the handelsbolag, but differ on the options
available to issue stock. The kommanditbolag is similar, but where the kommandit is
individually liable. Since neither can issue stock however, the passive investor has little
to gain from this arrangement.
When incorporating, there is also a minimum capital requirement of approximately
12,000 USD for private and 60,000 USD for public companies. 41 This is tied to another
limitation on the distribution and use of contributed or generated capital. A corporation’s
initial issuance of stock, given that stocks are not issued at a premium, form the
company’s contributed capital. This capital cannot be used for dividends and the
investors and stakeholders are therefore prohibited from emptying the corporation from
funds. Similar provisions can be seen in accounting standards in the US, but in Sweden,
the regulations are directly sanctioned in the corporate code. The assets in the company,
minus liabilities, must always maintain this level of capital and the directors can become
personally liable for using said assets, regardless of the cause, if certain criteria are met.
The rules are primarily in place to protect creditors. This seems to be a somewhat
awkward arrangement as creditors usually demand mortgage backed securities to be
issued and in the case of a lending institute, such as a bank, they should be sophisticated
39
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enough to evaluate risk. The demands on capital instead impact shareholders whom will
maintain a level of protection from dilution or distribution on their initial investment. The
amount of capital can be revised with shareholder approval (each individual shareholder
and class has veto power under certain conditions). If the contributed capital falls below
half of the stated capital however, the company can be forced into liquidation. Capital
requirements in Swedish companies contrast them starkly from US corporations where,
under extreme circumstances, the equity can have negative value if there are no assets
and only debt.
The differences described should create variances in risk assessment and hence
impact the demand of return on invested capital; higher risk should mean higher demand
and vice versa. As was stated initially however, the US and Swedish private equity
markets seem to be equally efficient if per capita investment is used to measure
willingness to invest. The answer seems to lie in other tools employed in the Swedish
regulatory system which allow for an attractive balance to be struck between the
investors demand for return and the legislator’s intentions to protect the market at large.
The unwillingness of the regulatory bodies in Sweden to introduce new types of
corporate forms, and whether to do away with a minimum capital requirement in
corporations, was the subject of a governmental study as recently as 2008. 42
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consensus seems to be that the system in place provides for ample incentives while
safeguarding creditor and shareholder interests. The reasons lie, in part, with the systems
impositions of liabilities.
In the US, as has been described, the liabilities in closely held corporations are often
of a fiduciary nature. Sweden, on the other hand, has stringent statutory demands for
finding breaches of fiduciary duties. As a civil law country the case law provides little
guidance when trying to determine the particulars of a given situation regarding fiduciary
duties. Directors, according to the Swedish Corporate Code, have a fiduciary duty to act
in good faith and in the best interests of the company. Any member of the board of
directors, or the managing director, may be liable for damages towards the company
where, in the performance of his duties, he willfully or negligently causes the company to
suffer damage. In order for liability to the shareholders to arise, the act must be in vio42
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lation of the Swedish Companies Act, the Swedish Annual Report’s Act, or the articles of
association. 43 The heightened fiduciary duty owed by shareholders to other shareholders
in a close corporation in some US jurisdictions is not limited to closely held corporations
in Sweden. The code creates liability not only to the company but to other shareholders or
“others”. 44 The broadness of this liability should not be overstated. Though such liability
exists as a feasible tort claim, few cases provide insight into when such a liability might
actually be imposed. The reason for this might lie in the courts unwillingness to adapt a
more stringent standard of review.
Sweden, as a civil law country, employs a method of statutory and contractual
interpretation which differs from the US. The method in which corporate contracts are
formed and interpreted is, in practice, wholly different. The courts are given ample room
to subjectively interpret contracts and claims resembling equity are not uncommon in
contract situations. In essence, the court will view what is fair and just and was in the
reasonable expectations of the parties upon entering the contract. Opposite this modus of
interpretation are the statutory provisions; which are generally interpreted very
restrictively. The result of these two factors is that “unfair” contracts can be amended or
voided and if you are not in violation of a specific provision – chances are good no
liability will be imposed absent obvious and ascertainable damages.
Cumulatively, the regulatory regime and operation of law set a high burden on a
disgruntled party to prove damage to the corporation or their interests. The regulations in
place therefore differ to the duty of care and loyalty as is the case in the US. As was
mentioned earlier however, the system in the US is perhaps not as strict as it would first
seem, given the options available to contract around such duties; options not available in
Sweden. There also seems to be an unwillingness to engage in litigation in Sweden. This
could be due to the fact that usually the loser is given the honor of paying the litigation
costs. Coupled with the fact that there are much fewer corporations, and people
(approximately nine million), the case law which would otherwise have outlined the
boundaries for fiduciary duties is not abundant. As a result, the litigious tradition seen in
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the US is not present in Sweden, and ex ante solutions by means of regulation seem to be
the favored mode of governance.
These somewhat limited fiduciary duties are, however, coupled with a wholly
different regulatory tool; the duty to treat all shareholders equally.45 This regulation
provides that all shareholders must receive the same benefit or detriment and as such
complements the fiduciary rules described. The end result seems to be that shareholders,
regardless of class, can find adequate protection from oppression. The “fiduciary out”
tactic seen in the US is less common in Sweden as the rule is statutorily mandated and
cannot be contracted away. A final tool in providing security to investors is the variance
in merger and takeover provisions. In large, Sweden mimics the European standards and
as such do not allow a statutory merger to dilute rights of certain classes of shares. An
interesting development however, is the case stemming from the EU, which now
supersedes national law in many cases. In the SEVIC case 46 the court concluded that the
EC Treaty 47 establishes a right for transnational mergers. This coupled with the Centros
case, 48 which establishes a right for registration of a corporation formed legally in
another member state, creates a new area of law which could impact certain of the
Swedish Corporate rules. As Danelius discusses in his article, the result could be that
companies wishing to avoid the capital requirements in Sweden could incorporate in the
UK and then simply set up shop in Sweden. 49 The impact on the private equity market of
these decisions is largely unknown, in part because the cases are fairly recent, but it is
feasible that investors looking to take advantage of both systems could do so.
In Europe, revisiting old and outdated regulations have long been contested subjects.
As recently as 2006 words such as “regulatory fatigue” and “enabling legislation” were
used to describe the shift in policy. 50 Sweden has long held its ground as these winds of
change swept across Europe while at the same time being sensitive to progressive reform.
As late as 2005, Sweden passed a new Corporate code which revisited many of the old
dogmas long perceived as redundant. One issue where the regulatory will of the EU and
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Sweden have not been able to agree is on that of voting rights on separate issues of
shares. The prevailing principle in the EU seems to be that of “one share one vote” while
in Sweden there has been a long tradition of separate voting rights for different issues of
stock within the same class. 51 Naturally a shift in policy in Sweden could impact
potential investors risk assessments but the effect of a shift is largely a speculative one.

CONCLUSIONS
If a relaxation of rules governing corporations provide a marketplace where parties
can contract freely; at least in theory, there exists an efficient market for corporate
control. The efficient market hypothesis mandates that share price premiums would
provide incentives to contract in ways beneficial to the longstanding goals of the
corporation. The approach in the US, where protection of corporate capital are remedied
by bankruptcy, accounting, and property laws, the fiduciary duties play a vital role in
maintaining a level of accountability for the management and controlling shareholders.
The market seems to have adopted an approach to investor contracts which therefore
provide incentives premised on equity growth. If the return on investment is realized –
the company is prosperous. Demands on capital and other regulatory techniques imposed
on corporate entities in Sweden instead mandate protection statutorily and impose duties
of faith by eliminating temptations to divert funds. By also providing courts with the
discretion necessary to remedy injustices, the system seems to have found a balance
between control and ownership which allows for an efficient market.
Both systems seem to have evolved to allow for efficient markets, but the question of
whether a regulatory scheme demanding stringent control of the governing parties is
superior remains to be seen. If the private equity market in the US survives the recent
credit crisis, it will be a testament to the resilience of the system. On the other hand, large
costs of labor and heavy tax burdens in Sweden have not deterred investors from placing
capital in the Scandinavian markets. Future studies might determine how large the
demanded return on capital is in each country respectively. This could might shed some
light on the apparent paradox created when two different approaches to regulating
corporate governance seem to produce very similar results; an efficient market. In sum,
51

Danelius, SvJT 2006, s 919.

the Swedish capital market provides proof that regulation has not, despite higher taxes
and labor costs, discouraged investors to make Sweden the third largest private equity
market per capita in the world.

